Developing a Knowledge
Strategy: Epilogue.
Published in The Strategic
Management of Intellectual Capital and Organizational Knowledge: A Collection of
Readings,
N. Bontis and C. W. Choo (eds.),
Oxford University Press, March, 2002
Michael H. Zack
Northeastern University
Boston MA 02115
m.zack@neu.edu
Introduction.
This epilogue presents additional
observations and findings I have made as I continue to research the
knowledge-strategy link first described in Zack (1999). I start by discussing
the extent to which this link appears to be missing in many of today's
corporations. I then clarify the term knowledge strategy and attempt to
distinguish it from other similar terms in use today. I raise the need for
taking an external view toward benchmarking a firm's knowledge against its
competitors to identify knowledge opportunities and threats, rather than
focusing only on internal strengths and weaknesses and expand the discussion on
strategic learning raised in Zack (1999). I close with some implications of the
knowledge strategy approach for market segmentation, organizational structure,
new product development, and strategic alliances.
The basic premise
revisited.
In introducing the knowledge
strategy framework, I made two assertions (Zack 1999 p.126):
-
The link between knowledge
management and business strategy, while often talked about has rarely been
put into practice.
-
Executives are in need of a
framework to help them understand the knowledge-strategy link
The evidence from further research
in this area continues to overwhelmingly support those assertions. While many of
the organizations recognize the importance of developing a strategic rationale
for investing in knowledge creation and exploitation, they continue to be, for
the most part, driven by focused, short-term, first-order outcomes rather than
broader, longer-term strategic goals.
Those organizations that do attempt
the strategic link typically begin by developing a knowledge management
initiative and then trying to work "backwards" to determine its impact on the
organization's strategy. They assume that knowledge management is "strategic"
because it potentially improves knowledge creation and sharing. They frame
knowledge strategy generically, in terms of knowledge exploration/creation vs.
exploitation/codification (March 1991, Hansen, Norhia and Tierney 1999) and the
configuration of organizational and technological resources to support those
orientations. These categories, however, are process-oriented and do not speak
to the issue of what knowledge needs to be exploited or created. This
results in organizations attempting to share what they know without first
understanding what they need to share. They are attacking their knowledge
process gaps without considering their strategic knowledge content
gaps. This is not to say that knowledge processing and organizational learning
is not a strategic capability with its own intrinsic value. However, the mere
act of processing knowledge itself does not guarantee strategic advantage.
As an example, consider Image Corp.
(Zack 1999). They were doing an excellent job managing the exploration and
exploitation of knowledge related to physical/analog cameras and film. They had
an appropriate culture, a useful technology and well-designed knowledge
management roles and processes. They judged their knowledge management
initiatives a success - and from a process perspective they were. Their
competitive strategy, however, called for a rapid move to digital imaging.
Unfortunately the organization did not know much about how to develop,
manufacture, distribute, fund, price, or service information systems hardware
and software - the foundation of digital photography. And they were not
systematically managing the acquisition, creation or sharing of this missing
knowledge. While they were enjoying a near-term success, they were facing a
potential future catastrophe. In the same vein, I studied a Fortune 50 firm
whose strategy was to move from an engineering to a marketing focus without
having the necessary marketing knowledge and skills. They did not systematically
diagnose or manage this knowledge gap, and their knowledge management
initiatives were focused elsewhere.
Similarly, I observed many firms
whose strategy dictated a move to an e-business model without the requisite
knowledge and skills and a knowledge management initiative to address those
knowledge gaps. Others were migrating from selling products to selling
knowledge-based services and solutions, without their first understanding what
they knew (or did not know) about being a service provider, or identifying the
unique value (if any) to be found in their existing knowledge. As explained by
executives of one organization:
While you try to wrap as
much knowledge around product as possible, it's different when you're
solving customer problems throughout the whole application process as
opposed to focusing on just [the product].
You might have understood
everything about this [product], but let's get away from the [product]
and figure out how you apply it so that the customer gains an advantage
through the application. What is it about that product that the customer
sees value in, or how can you enhance that product so that the customer
gains benefit?
Again, their knowledge management
programs, while effective from a process and infrastructure perspective, were
not addressing key strategic content gaps.
In contrast, the knowledge strategy
framework suggests that firms start with strategy and its link to knowledge
before initiating formal knowledge management programs. Let the firm's strategy
guide the management of its intellectual resources and capabilities.
I have found generally that the
degree to which firms are attempting to link their intellectual resources and
capabilities to strategy is associated with the extent to which their core
product or service is knowledge-based. For example, consulting firms - in the
business of selling knowledge - will tend to consider managing knowledge as a
strategic issue more than firms producing physical products or services.
However, surprisingly, I even have observed several consulting firms and others
selling knowledge-based products who have not directly linked the management of
their intellectual capital with their strategic processes.
One indicator of the degree to
which knowledge is viewed strategically is the organizational linkage between
those responsible for strategy and those responsible for knowledge management. I
have found that the most strategically aware organizations have tightly
integrated the responsibility for strategic management and knowledge management.
For example, at Lincoln Re (Zack 1999), the same executive is responsible for
both corporate strategy and knowledge management. At Xerox, the corporate
knowledge management function reports to the office of strategy. Others have
created separate organizational units linked via the strategic planning process.
Most, however, maintain separate groups who may have little to no ongoing
communication or coordination between them.
A secondary indicator is the extent
of public relations directed toward building an image of the company as a
knowledge-based organization. One organization I observed employed a PR staff to
manage external communication to insure a consistent message supporting the
image of the company as knowledge-based. They reinforced this in their annual
report, press releases, speaking opportunities at conferences, trade journal
articles, and other communication outlets.
Clarifying the term
Knowledge Strategy.
The term knowledge strategy is
coming into greater use, but is being used in various ways in the literature and
the practitioner community. To bring some precision to the term, I make two
distinctions. The first is between knowledge strategy and knowledge-management
strategy. They are not the same. Knowledge strategy, as used in my article,
implies a notion of knowledge-based strategy, that is, competitive strategy
built around a firm's intellectual resources and capabilities. Once a firm
identifies opportunities, threats, strengths and weaknesses related to its
intellectual resources and capabilities, then actions it may take to manage
knowledge gaps or surpluses (e.g., recruiting for particular skills, building
online document repositories, establishing communities of practice, acquiring
firms, licensing technologies, etc.) are guided by a knowledge management
strategy. Knowledge strategy is oriented toward understanding what knowledge is
strategic and why. Knowledge management strategy guides and defines the
processes and infrastructure (organizational and technological) for managing
knowledge. Knowledge management strategy typically includes broad generic
components (e.g., emphasizing tacit vs. explicit knowledge, knowledge
exploration vs. exploitation, or organizational vs. technical mechanisms for
knowledge exchange) as well as those that are firm-specific (e.g., support for
globally distributed field technicians). Regardless, it should focus action on
strategic knowledge gaps or surpluses.
The second distinction is between
knowledge strategy and what I call strategic knowledge management. To
effectively formulate strategy, firms need to know things about themselves (their
strengths and weaknesses regarding their resources and capabilities) and their
competitive environment (opportunities and threats). The processes and
infrastructures firms employ to acquire, create and share knowledge for
formulating strategy I call strategic knowledge management. It is a type
of knowledge management. It is not knowledge strategy. It involves all
the things we have come to associate with knowledge management like communities
of practice, information technologies, and knowledge management roles. But the
knowledge management activities are directed towards providing knowledge for
formulating strategy and making strategic decisions. For example, one company I
observed created a formal strategic planning community that included people
representing various functional and geographical units of the organization,
supported by an online discussion area and document repository. Another created
an online mechanism to gather competitive environmental knowledge from field
technicians and sales people and make it available to those formulating strategy.
In both cases, they were engaged in strategic knowledge management, the results
of which could be used to formulate a knowledge strategy.
A third distinction can be made
between strategic knowledge management and operational (or tactical) knowledge
management. In addition to the knowledge needed to formulate strategy, firms
need to know and know how to do particular things well to execute their strategy.
This may include servicing customers better than their competitors can or
building higher quality products. The knowledge required to support more
efficient and effective operations is the focus of traditional knowledge
management. I call this type of knowledge management operational knowledge
management. Operational knowledge management supports the day-to-day
activities and processes needed to execute a firm's strategy. For example, one
organization I observed created formalized communities of practice around
various aspects of automobile assembly. Another built an online capability for
salespeople to share tips and techniques across sales regions. A consulting firm
made its engagement documents accessible to other consultants. Another provided
an online mechanism for locating expertise across the organization when trying
to solve a client's problem. These are the familiar knowledge management
examples and initiatives that we read about. They should be aligned with the
firm's business strategy to provide long-term value.
Firms, therefore, must practice
effective strategic knowledge management to enable informed strategic
decision-making. They must practice effective operational knowledge
management to ensure they bring all required knowledge to bear on executing
their strategy. However, to start, they must formulate a knowledge strategy to
understand what knowledge they should be managing.
The internal vs. the
external view.
Most firms have directed their
knowledge management activities toward understanding and sharing what they
currently know. The premise is that they have available somewhere all the
knowledge they need. Their approach is to identify what they know and provide a
mechanism for locating and sharing that knowledge. This usually starts with some
type of knowledge mapping process. Knowledge mapping for that purpose is an
operationally focused adjunct of knowledge management. The strategic use of a
knowledge map, however, is not merely to catalog existing knowledge, but to map
existing knowledge against what is required to formulate and execute the
organization's strategy. Further, the map can be used to evaluate how an
organization's knowledge compares to its competitors. If we think of strategy as
defending knowledge positions rather than product/market positions, then
competitive knowledge benchmarking is crucial for evaluating the firm's
competitive position. Where a firm holds a strong strategic knowledge position,
it may be prudent to invest to maintain that position. Where it holds a weak
knowledge position, it may be prudent to invest to gain strength. These
knowledge management decisions must be made within the context of
knowledge-based competitive opportunities and threats.
Most organizations I have observed
do not attempt to systematically understand what their competitors know. Some
organizations have a unit engaged in business intelligence or similar scanning
function. However, business intelligence typically is not part of the knowledge
management function, therefore the benchmarking of an organization's knowledge
against competitors is rarely done. Further, most business intelligence
functions attempt to identify what competitors are doing, not what they know.
However, it is possible to infer competitor knowledge based on their actions,
products, and services. One company I observed learned about competitors' stages
of knowledge by debriefing people they hired that had worked for the competition
or had had interviewed with them. According to one senior executive,
I know [Competitor X] is
not interested in a lot of the tools that we’re using in sales and
marketing because the person that’s designed most of those is somebody
that we hired from them. He had these great ideas, and they said, 'We're
not going that way.' So I know I’m way out in front of them on that.
Knowing vs. Learning.
The article identified one source
of the strategic value of knowledge as lying in its sustainable uniqueness based
on increasing returns. Applying the notions of time compression, asset mass
efficiencies, and asset complementarity (Deidrix and Cool 1989) to intellectual
resources, a knowledge advantage is sustainable if the knowledge-superior firm
continues to learn from experience at least as well as its competitors (Zack
1999). The article, while addressing issues of exploration and learning, goes on
to focus more on knowledge superiority than learning superiority. However, the
dynamics of firm learning capabilities and industry learning cycles need more
attention (especially in these turbulent times of e-business). Further thought
and field observations have led me to propose that learning superiority will
dominate knowledge superiority. A firm that does not have superior knowledge but
is a better learner than the knowledge-superior firm eventually should attain
knowledge superiority. A firm that has strategically superior knowledge and is
superior learner should be able to maintain its dominant competitive position.
Therefore, firms need to focus as
much on their strategic learning gaps as on their knowledge gaps. And so the gap
analysis should not only focus on what the firm needs to know vs. what it does
know, but on how much, how rapidly and how effectively it needs to learn to
execute its strategy and defend its knowledge position.
Learning must be externally
benchmarked not only against particular competitors, but against the firm's
industry in general. The article raised the notion of a learning cycle for a
firm and an industry. Similar to Nonaka's (1994) framework whereby tacit
knowledge developed within one organizational unit is made explicit, transferred
to another unit, applied within the new unit and thereby made tacit again; firms
develop and transfer knowledge among themselves within their industry. An
organization develops tacit knowledge as a byproduct of its activities. This
knowledge may be made explicit to facilitate its transfer among other units of
the organization. In doing so, it may leak out of the organization into the
industry at large. At the same time, the organization may be absorbing knowledge
leaking out of other firms within its industry, and internalizing that knowledge
through its reapplication within the firm.
Each firm in an industry has some
capability for engaging in this learning cycle. It may be more or less capable
of identifying its own tacit knowledge, explicating and sharing it within the
firm, limiting its transfer out of the firm, absorbing external knowledge from
the industry and reapplying that external knowledge in some unique and strategic
way.
The strategic knowledge environment
of an industry can be viewed as the sum of the interactions among the knowledge
strategies of the individual firms in the industry. Firms taking a conservative
approach to knowledge strategy tend to be more internally focused and attempt to
create barriers to knowledge transferring outside their organization. The
objective is to financially exploit the knowledge for as long as possible. If
the industry is characterized by conservative knowledge-strategy firms, then
little knowledge moves through the industry and little is available to be
absorbed from the outside. We can characterize the industry, then , as one
having slow learning cycles. A conservative strategy may make sense for firms in
industries where knowledge diffuses slowly, has a relatively long "shelf life"
and therefore provides the opportunity to exploit that knowledge via explication
and reuse without great exposure to imitation by competitors.
Barriers to knowledge diffusion may
take several forms (Teece 1998). Strong patents may provide sufficient
protection in some industries, for example pharmaceuticals. Barriers may also
occur in industries that are based on technologies whose transfer is ‘sticky”.
Stickiness may occur when the technology does not adhere to an industry standard
or where no standard exists, making adoption risky, for example in electronics
(e.g. the introduction of 56K modems or VHS vs. Betamax video formats). It may
also arise where the technology lacks well-defined interfaces to other firms’
existing technologies, is embedded in a complex web of complementary
technologies, or requires tight coupling to the other firms’ existing
technologies, making adoption difficult and complex (e.g. enterprise-wide
information system software packages). Adoption may be costly or diffusion
irrelevant where knowledge is highly specific to the source-firm’s context for
application and use. And some knowledge may be just too confusing for the rest
of the industry to understand and adopt (Lippman and Rumelt 1982, Reed and
DeFillippi 1990). For example, LeaseCo (Zack 1999) was unable to explain its
pricing scheme to a competitor it was attempting to acquire. The approach was so
different from that of the industry that the competitor could not make sense of
the economic framework and assumptions on which it was based[1].
Firms adopting an aggressive
knowledge strategy accept the premise that continual learning is the key to
maintaining a knowledge advantage. They are less concerned with what they know
at any point in time, assuming they or their competitors will render that
knowledge obsolete in the near-term. For example, CapitalOne has made this
premise an explicit part of their strategy. Rather than concentrate on creating
barriers to knowledge diffusing into the industry, they focus more on
maintaining their capacity to learn and to absorb knowledge from the industry.
Organizationally, they recognize the value of the tacit knowledge of their
employees, and focus on retaining them via an attractive culture and work
environment. While the leaner, more abstract explicit knowledge may diffuse out
of the firm, the richer tacit knowledge providing the firm its sustainable
knowledge-advantage still remains within the firm. That tacit knowledge is what
enables the firm to learn faster and to develop more creative and valuable
insights than its competitors.
Having strong barriers to knowledge
diffusion or operating in a slow-cycle industry does not preclude firms from
taking a more aggressive knowledge strategy. However, it suggests that in that
context a moderately aggressive knowledge strategy may provide sufficient
advantage. For example, knowledge diffusion in LeaseCo's industry occurred
slowly. LeaseCo therefore had an incentive to invest in and to explicate their
strategic knowledge because they could exploit it over a long enough period to
recoup their investment while having low exposure to its diffusion. They in fact
captured much of their knowledge in electronic documents and a computer-based
decision support system enabling the knowledge to be easily, efficiently and
consistently distributed to and used by a wide range of employees. They had
perhaps a more aggressive knowledge strategy than needed and took more
knowledge-building risks than required to compete in their industry, a
reflection of LeaseCo's culture and the CEO's personal desire to "keep things
interesting". The result, however, was a clear and persistent dominance in their
markets accompanied by high profit margins relative to the industry.
In industries characterized by
aggressive knowledge strategy firms, knowledge moves through the industry
rapidly. We can characterize the industry, then, as one having rapid learning
cycles. In general, more knowledge in total should be available for absorption
from outside the firm than the amount diffusing out of any individual firm.
However, only those firms with the best learning capability and the greatest
capacity for absorbing external knowledge will benefit the most. Firms
implementing an aggressive knowledge strategy from a strong existing knowledge
position supplemented by an effective learning capability, should gain more
knowledge than they lose and be able to maintain their strong knowledge
position.
Ultra-aggressive firms proactively
transfer their knowledge out of the firm to accelerate the learning cycle. One
approach is to transfer out only part of the knowledge, creating a knowledge
dependency on the remainder of the knowledge that is more highly protected. This
is similar to the strategy taken by software companies that protect their main
program source code but distribute sufficient knowledge of the program's
workings to enable others to develop compatible programs with seamless
interfaces. Other firms offer their knowledge in hopes of creating or
influencing de facto industry standards. An example of perhaps the most
aggressive strategy is that of the open-source movement used, for example, to
develop the Linux computer operating system, which makes public the core source
code to take advantage of those innovations others may develop[2].
A firm's strategy, by placing it
within an industry, also places it within some industry learning cycle and
therefore determines the learning capabilities it must maintain. Likewise, a
shift in business strategy can move firms to industries with learning cycles
different than they are used to. Even having adequate knowledge to enter a new
competitive position, may not be sufficient if the learning capability of the
firm is inadequate. For example, Image Corp., facing a major technological
discontinuity, was shifting from the more conservative learning cycle of the
physical consumer goods industry to the highly aggressive industry learning
cycle of computer software and systems.
In industries characterized by
aggressive innovation cycles, firms may have to adopt an aggressive knowledge
strategy or fall by the wayside. Firms without a learning capability, the
ability to understand, acquire and absorb industry knowledge, or the knowledge
management infrastructure to support unbounded innovation may need to search for
a more compatible strategic position.
Knowledge-based customer
segmentation.
The focus on strategic learning has
resulted in several organizations I observed changing the notion of customer
segmentation from a product/market orientation to one focused on knowledge and
learning. That is, they categorize customers not by what the firm can sell them,
but by the value of the learning opportunity those potential customers may
provide. Customers might then be pursued not for the current revenue they could
generate, but for the opportunity to learn how to provide new products and
services leading to additional revenue in the future. A "good" customer would be
one that requires a significant amount of customer-specific knowledge to
service, yet provides a long-term return sufficient to recoup the investment in
learning required. If the relationship is one of a contractual nature (e.g.,
leasing, insurance, real estate, auditing, and various services, etc.) then the
objective is to acquire the contract (even at a potential initial loss) and
learn enough about serving the customer to preclude less knowledgeable
competitors from obtaining the business when up for rebid. If the relationship
is non-contractual, then the goal is to become sufficiently more knowledgeable
about the customer than competitors and to combine that knowledge with the
product or service, giving the customer an incentive not to do business with
competitors. Because of the increasing returns to knowledge, if the firm is at
least as good at learning as its competitors (and is willing and able to turn
its learning into action (Pfeffer and Sutton 2000)), it should continue to
retain the customer's loyalty as long as serving the customer requires unique,
inimitable and non-substitutable knowledge. Firms not taking a customer-specific
learning-based approach will find customers having less unique knowledge
requirements to be more suitable.
Some customers, particularly those
under contractual relationships, may provide enough revenue potential that they
directly pay back the investment in learning. For example, Buckman Labs obtained
a sole-source contract to manage the chemical consumption of the Fort Howard
paper company. This is one of the first contracts in the industry where the
supplier takes the risk for managing the customer's cost of operations.
Typically, chemical companies maximize revenue by selling as much product as
possible. Key strategic knowledge has traditionally been product-oriented;
including the ability to manufacture, sell and distribute a low cost, high
quality product. While the industry has been migrating to value-added services,
the Buckman/Fort Howard deal has taken this to its extreme. Because Buckman is
paid a flat rate based on production volume, Buckman now has an incentive to
minimize the amount of chemical sold. Profitability now depends on applying
its knowledge of the customer's total manufacturing system and how to run it
efficiently, not merely knowledge of its own products. In fact, Buckman, to
maximize mill performance (and its own profitability), may have to provide
competitors' products in certain cases where it does not carry a needed
chemical.
In addition to customer-specific
learning, most learning-intensive customers provide the ability to reapply that
unique knowledge elsewhere with other potential customers. For example, Lincoln
Re contracts to reinsure difficult or novel risks so that it can learn how to
develop new products and markets for these new classes of risk management. Its
unique knowledge and learning opportunities gives it an advantage over
competitors in those new markets.
Knowledge-based
organization design.
Organizations are typically
designed to maximize communication, coordination and interaction among those
performing similar or interdependent tasks. Knowledge-focused organizations,
however, seek opportunities to maximize communication, coordination and
interaction among units to create knowledge synergies. For example, an
information technology industry research firm I studied (Zack 1996) originally
created separate organization units around its various product and service
domains (e.g., data warehousing, client-server computing, and groupware).
However, it realized that the knowledge being created within various units could
be combined to generate new insights and, ultimately, new research products for
its clients. For example, knowledge management technology represents the
intersection of many existing areas such as business intelligence, intranets,
online learning, data mining, and groupware. By bringing traditional units
together into "virtual" lines of business, they were able to create entirely new
sets of knowledge that could be spun off into new products.
Similarly, units may be combined
because they provide better learning opportunities together than separating them
by products or markets. For example, public accounting firms have traditionally
organized by function: tax, audit and consulting. However, some are finding that
by bringing these functions together by customer or industry, they can create
greater insights into customer's problems and requirements than each can
individually[3].
Knowledge Surpluses.
The knowledge strategy framework
also accommodates a positive knowledge gap - a situation where a firm knows "more"
than it needs given its current strategy. This suggests the firm has knowledge
it is not exploiting fully. The typical case is where firms hold patents they
are neither using nor licensing. Patent management has become more active
recently (Rivette and Klein 1999). However, again I did not observe many cases
where firms systematically considered whether or not they could further exploit
their tacit or non-patented knowledge in new products or markets. They may do
this, but it is not explicitly or directly linked to the strategic planning
process.
Knowledge Alliances.
I observed several firms engaged in
a significant level of alliance activity. However, the alliances, while often
made to acquire knowledge, skills and technologies, were not mapped to the
firm's strategic knowledge gaps. Again, those responsible for formulating
alliances were not connected to those responsible for managing the firm's
intellectual resources and capabilities.
Conclusion.
If one accepts the premise that
knowledge is the (or at least one of the) most strategic resources of a firm,
then a firm' s business strategy should reflect the role of knowledge in helping
the firm to compete. Once the link between strategy and knowledge is defined,
then other aspects of strategic management such as resource allocation,
organization design, product development and market segmentation can be
configured to bolster knowledge strengths, reduce knowledge weaknesses,
capitalize on knowledge-based competitive opportunities and mitigate
knowledge-based competitive threats.
Where strategic knowledge is strong,
knowledge management can focus on enabling knowledge sharing and distribution,
and ensuring that learning is focused on maintaining a strong competitive
knowledge-position. Where opportunities abound, knowledge management can focus
on exploiting the firm's "knowledge platform" by deriving new products or
services from or by locating new markets for its knowledge. Where weaknesses
exist, knowledge management must focus on acquiring knowledge, for example
through training, recruiting, or alliances. Where threats loom, knowledge
management must focus on providing sufficient learning opportunities and
capabilities to strengthen the firm's knowledge position. In all cases, a firm's
strategic agenda and competitive context should drive the priorities for
knowledge management.
References.
Dierickx, I. and K. Cool, "Asset
Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of Competitive Advantage", Management
Science, Vol. 35 No. 12 , 1989, p.1504
Hansen, M. T., N. Nohria, and
Tierney, T., "What's Your Strategy For Managing Knowledge?", Harvard Business
Review, Vol. 77, No. 2 , 1999, p. 106
Lippman, S. A. and R. P. Rumelt,
“Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm Differences in Efficiency under
Competition”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, 1982, pp. 418-438
March, J.G., "Exploration and
Exploitation in Organizational Learning", Organization Science, Vol. 2,
No. 1, 1991, pp. 71-87
Nonaka, I., “A Dynamic Theory of
Organizational Knowledge Creation”, Organization Science, vol. 5, no. 1,
1994, pp.14-37
Pfeffer, J. and R. Sutton, The
Knowing-doing Gap : How Smart Companies Turn Knowledge into Action, Harvard
Business School Press, Boston, 2000
Reed, R. and R. J. DeFillippi,
“Causal Ambiguity, Barriers to Imitation, and Sustainable Competitive Advantage”,
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1990, pp. 88-102
Rivett, K. and D. Kline,
Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the Hidden Value of Patents, Harvard
Business School Press, 1999
Teece, D. J., "Capturing Value form
Knowledge Assets: The New Economy, Markets for Know-how, and Intangible Assets",
California Management Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, Spring, 1998, pp. 55-79
Zack, M. H., "Electronic Publishing:
A Product Architecture Perspective", Information & Management, Vol. 31,
No. 2, November, 1996, pp. 75-86
Zack, M. H., "Developing a
Knowledge Strategy", California Management Review, Vol. 41, No. 3, Spring,
1999, pp. 125-145
[1] It may have
been that the pricing scheme was so illogical and ill-conceived that no
firm would be expected to understand it. However, in this case,
LeaseCo's unique approach proved to provide a significant competitive
advantage, enabling them to service several markets without encountering
significant competition.
[2] See E. S.
Raymond, “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”, 1998/05/13 17:29:31
(http://sagan.earthspace.net/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar.html)
for the reasoning behind the open source movement.
[3] On the other
hand, they are constrained, of course, by the SEC's concern with
objectivity, especially as it relates to firms auditing the work of
their tax and consulting divisions.
|
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документов
- Удаленный доступ или работа пользователя
из любой точки мира (при условии подключения
к Интернету).
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Система FLAMORY™ |
FLAMORY™ — уникальный программный продукт, позволяющий сохранять историю действий пользователя на компьютере, таких, например, как работа в приложениях Windows, посещения сайтов и д.р.
Сохраненные последовательности действий, далее, можно просмотреть, сохранить в файл и передать коллегам. FLAMORY позволяет аккумулировать и делиться знаниями.
Работая с FLAMORY, обмен опытом, обучение новых сотрудников, обсуждения технологий, становятся, как никогда ранее, простой и удобной, в практических аспектах, задачей.
FLAMORY™ разрабатывается при участии специалистов KMSOFT.
Скачать бета-версию можно по этой ссылке.
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